Israel slows Gaza strikes under US pressure but keeps military grip tight
Israel has eased the intensity of its Gaza operations under pressure from the United States but refuses to withdraw its forces and will keep targeting Hamas militants until national elections later this year, according to conflict tracking data.
Source: ACLED · August 17, 2026 at 4:30 PM · AI-assisted report
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KUALA LUMPUR, 18 AUGUST 2026 —
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Israel has eased the intensity of its Gaza operations under pressure from the United States but refuses to withdraw its forces and will keep targeting Hamas militants until national elections later this year, according to conflict tracking data.
The Israel Defense Forces have cut back on targeted assassinations since early August after Washington pressed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to reduce violence ahead of the US mid-term elections, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) said.
ACLED recorded no targeted strikes between 3 and 11 August; the first resumed on 12 August when an air strike killed a Hamas commander, followed by another on 13 August that killed a senior police official.
The pause is temporary. ACLED’s Gaza Conflict Monitor shows Israel launched about 200 strikes on Hamas personnel and security structures between 10 October 2025 and 14 August 2026, with nearly 60% of those attacks concentrated between May and July. July alone recorded the highest number of such strikes. ACLED also documented 38 air and drone strikes on police stations and security personnel during the same period, including members of the Hamas-linked Sahm and Radea units.
Despite the ceasefire agreed in October 2025, Israel has steadily expanded its footprint west of the so-called Yellow Line—a de facto boundary that Israel says Hamas uses to regroup—increasing controlled territory from roughly 53% in October 2025 to about 65% by the end of June 2026. ACLED maps show Israeli forces have placed concrete blocks marking the Yellow Line in at least nine locations since the start of August, including on 7 August.
Around 80% of all incidents involving Israeli forces occur within a few kilometres of this line, driven by drone fire, tank shells, crane-mounted weapons and direct gunfire at anyone approaching the area.
The IDF has framed its continued presence and operations as necessary to prevent Hamas from reconstituting military capacity, particularly among those involved in the 7 October 2023 attacks. Israel’s domestic intelligence service Shin Bet has formed a dedicated unit using facial recognition and AI to track militants linked to that day, a response to what it calls a major intelligence and security failure.
The unit’s work underscores Israel’s long-term goal of eliminating the Hamas command structure tied to the October attacks—an objective at odds with the 15-point peace plan proposed by former US President Donald Trump, which calls for an immediate halt to such targeting.
Israel has publicly rejected the Board of Peace’s plan, citing the need to dismantle Hamas before any withdrawal. ACLED’s data indicate that Israeli forces have pushed westward since the October 2025 ceasefire, expanding control despite earlier pledges of phased redeployment. The expansion has continued even as violence near the Yellow Line dipped slightly between 2 and 7 August before rising again between 8 and 14 August.
Analysts say the current slowdown in targeted killings is a tactical response to US pressure rather than a strategic shift. “The slowdown in assassinations suggests Washington’s leverage is already limiting some Israeli operations,” ACLED noted in its latest report. Israel’s national elections on 27 October complicate any further concessions, with domestic politics likely to prioritise security messaging over withdrawal.
Coalition partners and opposition figures have both warned against easing pressure on Hamas while armed groups remain active.
Hamas, meanwhile, has shown no sign of accepting disarmament terms. ACLED records sustained Israeli operations against Hamas police and security units, which the group uses to maintain internal control. The group’s refusal to disarm—amid threats of intensified Israeli strikes—indicates the militia sees political survival as its priority ahead of any potential vote in Gaza.
For Malaysian businesses with operations in the Levant or supply chains tied to the Middle East, the prolonged military posture raises direct costs. Shipping lines have rerouted vessels away from the eastern Mediterranean since October 2023, pushing freight rates on Asia-Europe routes up 18% year-on-year to RM4,200 per forty-foot container, according to industry data.
Insurers have also widened war-risk premiums by 25% for vessels transiting the Suez Canal, increasing overheads for Malaysian exporters reliant on the route.
Malaysia Impact
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