RCEP’s investment test: four years in, the bloc still struggles to anchor Asian capital
RCEP members retained only about one-fifth of their outward greenfield investment within the bloc between 2022 and 2024 despite a rise in new project announcements to US$178 billion last year.
Source: Lowy Institute · August 24, 2026 at 10:24 PM · AI-assisted report
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SINGAPORE, 25 AUGUST 2026 —
RCEP members retained only about one-fifth of their outward greenfield investment within the bloc between 2022 and 2024 despite a rise in new project announcements to US$178 billion last year.
Market Impact
Research by the Asia Competitiveness Institute at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy shows intra-RCEP greenfield announcements climbed from roughly US$125 billion in 2022 to US$178 billion in 2024. The increase, however, largely reflects established shifts such as China-plus-one supply chains and semiconductor diversification rather than a structural reallocation of regional capital.
ASEAN has been the clearest beneficiary. Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand captured most of the new manufacturing projects financed from Northeast Asia since RCEP took effect. China alone provided more than half of intra-bloc greenfield inflows in both 2023 and 2024, according to the institute’s analysis.
An emerging division of labour is visible: China, Japan and South Korea supply capital, technology and industrial networks, while ASEAN increasingly hosts production and assembly. The gains remain narrow. Manufacturing accounted for almost 90% of intra-RCEP greenfield investment in 2024, and a handful of economies captured most projects.
Japan recorded its highest greenfield inflows between 2019 and 2024, helped by a weaker yen, government incentives and demand for secure semiconductor and green-energy capacity. Taiwan became the largest source of new greenfield investment into RCEP economies as its semiconductor firms expanded in Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore.
For Malaysian business readers, the stakes are clear: RCEP’s next phase will determine whether the agreement can shift enough intra-Asian capital to compete with the United States, Europe and other regions for the next generation of factories, data centres, logistics hubs and clean-energy facilities.
The broader shortfall is regional. From 2022 to 2024, only about one-fifth of outward greenfield investment from RCEP members stayed within the bloc. The United States was the leading destination, while Brazil, Mexico and Morocco attracted firms seeking access to American and European markets.
RCEP’s legal design limits its transformative impact. The agreement preserves host governments’ regulatory autonomy, ties investment coverage to domestic law and omits disciplines on labour, environment, state-owned enterprises and digital issues that appear in the rival Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It also lacks investor-state dispute settlement, relying instead on state-to-state procedures and a work programme to revisit disputes.
The 2027 review offers a chance to upgrade the framework without attempting to replicate CPTPP’s more ambitious provisions. Recommendations include centralising investment regulations, establishing usable national contact points and improving coordination among agencies so that smaller firms face fewer opaque rules and fragmented approvals.
Members willing to adopt stronger protections could opt into a common dispute-settlement mechanism, allowing ambition to rise without threatening consensus. The review should also address sustainability and corporate responsibility, aligning investment rules with tighter climate reporting and supply-chain due-diligence requirements faced by multinationals.
The agreement has provided stability at a time of economic fragmentation. That is worthwhile, but insufficient for a mega-bloc covering roughly 30% of global GDP and population. Its 2027 review is an opportunity to turn geographic weight into strategic relevance by making investment rules easier to use, more credible across jurisdictions and better aligned with how firms now manage geopolitical risk.
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