Threat Landscape Report 2025: A Year in Review
Today we publish our annual Threat Landscape Report , covering the cyber threats that affected Union entities and their ecosystem in 2025. The report is based on our analysis of malicious activities of interest tracked throughout the year, using the analytical standards defined in our Cyber Threat Intelligence Framework , which we published earlier this year. In 2025, we identified at least 174 d
Source: CERT-EU · August 6, 2026 at 2:54 PM · AI-assisted report
KUALA LUMPUR, 6 AUGUST 2026 —
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Headline: Threat Landscape Report 2025: A Year in Review Lead: Today we publish our annual Threat Landscape Report , covering the cyber threats that affected Union entities and their ecosystem in 2025. The report is based on our analysis of malicious activities of interest tracked throughout the year, using the analytical standards defined in our Cyber Threat Intelligence Framework , which we published earlier this year.
In 2025, we identified at least 174 d Body: Today we publish our annual Threat Landscape Report , covering the cyber threats that affected Union entities and their ecosystem in 2025. The report is based on our analysis of malicious activities of interest tracked throughout the year, using the analytical standards defined in our Cyber Threat Intelligence Framework , which we published earlier this year.
In 2025, we identified at least 174 distinct threat actors engaged in malicious activity against Union entities or their ecosystem, a significant increase from 110 in 2024. Cyberespionage and prepositioning remained the dominant motive, accounting for 38% of recorded activity, but cybercrime grew to represent 30% of observations, reflecting both a genuine trend and the result of our expanded monitoring through automation and artificial intelligence.
Based on assessments by trusted partners and reliable sources, the largest share of attributable activity was associated with China-linked threat actors, closely followed by Russia-linked threat actors. Threat actors linked to China primarily conducted broad exploitation of vulnerabilities and supply-chain compromises, while threat actors linked to Russia continued to focus on entities in Ukraine and EU countries supporting Ukrainian efforts.
For the second consecutive year, the exploitation of vulnerabilities in internet-facing software was the initial access vector with the highest impact. CERT-EU responded to nine significant incidents in 2025, down from 15 in 2024. Vulnerability exploitation was the initial access vector in seven of these, including two zero-day compromises. Edge devices such as firewalls, VPN appliances, and network management solutions remained the primary targets, with Fortinet, Ivanti, Cisco, and Palo Alto products accounting for the bulk of observed attacks.
Our analysis identified 198 software products used by Union entities that were targeted or exploited, up from 110 in 2024.
A notable shift in 2025 was the diversification of social engineering techniques. E-mail-based spearphishing declined from 41% to 31% of initial access attempts, while voice phishing, Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks, ClickFix attacks, and device-code authentication abuse grew in prominence.
In one of the most significant campaigns of the year, threat actor UNC6040 used voice phishing to trick employees at over 90 organisations worldwide into authorising malicious OAuth applications in their Salesforce environments. Several vendors for Union entities were among those affected.
Threat actors also increasingly leveraged artificial intelligence to enhance their campaigns, including voice cloning, personalised phishing content, and deepfakes of officials. In a notable development, a reportedly China-linked threat actor directed a jailbroken agentic AI system against 30 entities across multiple sectors, achieving autonomous intrusion in a small number of cases.
We analysed 44 distinct events linked to malicious cyber activity, spanning conferences and summits, elections, conflicts, sanctions, and other geopolitical developments. Threat actors used these events both as lures in social engineering campaigns and as triggers for reactive operations such as hacktivism and digital foreign interference.
Eight national elections in EU and neighbouring countries were targeted, most accompanied by DDoS attacks from pro-Russia supposed hacktivists. Destructive attacks remained rare outside direct conflict zones, but the Sandworm-attributed attempted wiper attack on a Polish renewable energy operator in December demonstrated that such attacks can reach EU territory.
For the first time, this year’s report includes a dedicated analysis of threats targeting partner organisations. We observed 178 cases of malicious activity targeting 90 partner organisations, with public administrations accounting for 60% of this activity. Threat actors exploited trusted relationships with partners as a beachhead to attempt to reach Union entities, primarily through credential phishing from compromised partner e-mail accounts and data exposure from partner breaches.
We also tracked malicious activity affecting 32 service providers supporting Union entities. In one case, the compromise of a service provider with access to a Union entity’s internal systems led to a significant incident. Intrusions into telecommunications providers were recurrent and carried significant downstream risk.
The report concludes with strategic foresight and ten prioritised recommendations. Among the key trends we anticipate:
Our top recommendation remains the timely patching of internet-facing systems and edge devices: the single highest-impact defensive action based on our 2025 data. We also recommend that Union entities transition to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and adopt end-to-end encryption as the default for sensitive communications.
The full Threat Landscape Report 2025 is available for download on our website. The report is classified TLP:CLEAR and may be shared without restriction.
We welcome constructive feedback at services@cert.europa.eu .
CERT-EU is the Cybersecurity Service for the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, established under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 . Under the Cybersecurity Regulation, CERT-EU acts as the central cybersecurity hub for all Union entities, providing threat intelligence, incident response coordination, vulnerability management, and security guidance. CERT-EU also supports Union entities in implementing their cybersecurity risk-management frameworks and issues calls for action to raise the collective level of cybersecurity across the EU institutional ecosystem.
We only use cookies that are necessary for the technical functioning of our website. Find out more on here . Source: CERT-EU Published: 2026-08-06T14:54:20.875Z Region: OSINT Topic: Economy (AI-assisted rewrite, based on the original source)
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