Why NATO and the transatlantic bond will outlast Trump
Charles A. Kupchan, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, says Europe should plan for every eventuality with Donald Trump in the White House but need not fear the alliance will collapse.
Source: Council on Foreign Relations · August 25, 2026 at 5:30 PM · AI-assisted report
OpinionKUALA LUMPUR, 26 AUGUST 2026 —
NATO and US-Europe Ties Set to Endure Despite Trump’s Strains, Analysts Say
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KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 25 (Reuters) — Donald Trump’s sharp criticism of NATO and erratic foreign policy have unsettled Europe, but analysts say the alliance’s deep-rooted interests and rising defense spending make its collapse unlikely—even under a second Trump administration.
In an analysis published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Georgetown University professor Charles A. Kupchan argues that while Trump’s dismissive stance toward NATO, threats to withhold aid to Ukraine, and erratic moves like his Greenland proposal have fueled European unease, the alliance remains resilient due to shared strategic interests and enduring values.
“Europeans are understandably worried that their strategic partnership with the United States is coming to an end,” Kupchan writes. “Yet it is far too soon to pronounce the irreparable rupture and death of the transatlantic alliance.”
Despite Trump’s rhetoric—including calling allies “delinquent” over defense spending and musing about U.S. withdrawal from NATO—the U.S. is unlikely to abandon the alliance, Kupchan contends. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and Moscow’s military posture along NATO’s eastern flank make a U.S. exit strategically unwise, he argues, as American forces in Europe provide critical deterrence and power projection across Africa, the Middle East, and beyond.
Defense Spending Surge Under Trump’s Pressure A key factor in NATO’s durability is Europe’s response to Trump’s demands for burden-sharing. Nearly all NATO members have now pledged to spend at least 5% of GDP on defense and security infrastructure by 2035—an unprecedented commitment driven in part by Trump’s persistent hectoring and the resurgence of Russian aggression.
Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has built a broad political consensus behind major military investments, signaling a long-term shift in European defense posture. Kupchan notes that Trump’s approach, though tactless, has succeeded in shaking Europe out of post-Cold War complacency.
“Trump could certainly be more tactful as he pushes European allies to ramp up defense spending; his hectoring unnecessarily breeds resentment,” he writes. “But coupled with a resurgent Russian threat, Trump’s pressure campaign is working.”
Stronger Europe, Stronger Alliance Even amid ongoing military shortfalls, Europe has repeatedly demonstrated its reliability as a U.S. partner. European forces joined U.S. troops in the Balkans in the 1990s, contributed to the NATO mission in Afghanistan after 9/11, and participated in the campaign against ISIS. Most critically, European support has been to Ukraine’s survival amid Russia’s invasion.
Kupchan emphasizes that NATO enjoys strong bipartisan backing in Washington, reinforced by deep economic and societal ties. Transatlantic trade in goods and services exceeds $2 trillion annually, and over 1,000 flights cross the Atlantic every day during peak travel seasons—underscoring the dense web of interdependence.
“This network of strategic, political, economic, and societal linkages gives Trump every reason to keep NATO alive and well,” he states.
Malaysia and Southeast Asia Watch Closely While the transatlantic alliance’s future is a concern primarily for Europe and North America, its stability has broader implications for global security—including Southeast Asia. A weakened or divided NATO could embolden revisionist powers like Russia and China, potentially altering regional power dynamics.
Malaysia, as a non-NATO partner and active participant in regional security dialogues such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), has a vested interest in a predictable and cohesive Western security architecture. Any erosion of U.S. commitment to NATO could prompt reassessments in Kuala Lumpur and other ASEAN capitals about long-term defense planning and strategic alignment.
Defense analysts in Kuala Lumpur note that while Malaysia does not rely on NATO for its security, the alliance’s cohesion underpins broader stability in the Indo-Pacific—a region where U.S. leadership remains central to deterring aggression.
“A fractured NATO would complicate crisis management in Europe and could distract Washington from its Indo-Pacific strategy,” said a senior analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, who requested anonymity. “That indirectly affects Malaysia’s security calculus.”
Europe’s Strategic Gap: Military and Political Despite progress in defense spending, Europe still faces significant capability gaps. Kupchan highlights that even with increased budgets, it will take a decade or more for new investments to translate into full military readiness. In the interim, Europe remains dependent on U.S. military assets—including manpower, firepower, airlift, and intelligence.
While Britain and France possess nuclear weapons, their arsenals are limited in scale and deterrent power compared to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Kupchan warns that Europe cannot afford a strategic divorce from the U.S. given the ongoing threat from Russia.
Politically, Europe also struggles to consolidate its defense efforts. Despite calls for “strategic autonomy,” member states remain reluctant to cede control over national security decisions to EU institutions in Brussels. Rising populism and ethnonationalism further complicate efforts to pool sovereignty in defense matters.
“Absent greater political unity, which is for now unattainable, Europe will continue to punch below its weight,” Kupchan observes.
Forward-Looking: A NATO That Emerges Stronger Kupchan advises Europe to adopt a long-term strategy toward Trump—engaging when possible, resisting when necessary—while continuing to build its own defense capacity. In the best case, a more capable Europe strengthens the alliance. In the worst case, if the U.S. withdraws, Europe will be better prepared to defend itself.
“Europe’s best strategy is to manage and work with him—not confront and break with him,” he writes. “Europe needs to invest in its military capability regardless of the trajectory of U.S. policy.”
For Malaysia and its neighbors, the lesson is clear: even as regional powers like China and India rise, the transatlantic bond remains a cornerstone of global stability. Its endurance—despite political turbulence—suggests that the world’s security architecture, though tested, is not on the brink of collapse.
As Kupchan concludes: “The bottom line is that the United States still needs Europe, and Europe still needs the United States. That reality will not change anytime soon.”
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