Colombia’s Antioquia armed clashes surge 65% as mining, drugs fuel violence

ANTIOQUIA (COLOMBIA), BAJO CAUCA, NORDESTE, BRICEÑO, PARAMILLO NATIONAL PARK, CARIBBEAN COAST, REMEDIOS, SEGOVIA, EL BAGRE, CAUCASIA, ITUANGO, TARAZÁ, 22 SEPTEMBER 2026 —

Armed groups in Colombia’s Antioquia region have intensified clashes, with confrontations rising 65% in the first eight months of 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier, driven by competition over drug trafficking corridors and illegal gold mining, according to ACLED.

Northern Antioquia is a strategic hub for both legal and illegal gold mining and for drug trafficking routes linking the Andean cordillera to the Caribbean coast. Since the 2016 demobilisation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), dissident factions—including the EMBF 36th and 18th fronts and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—have contested the Gulf Clan’s dominance in the region, according to ACLED.

This year’s escalation stems from shifting alliances and new offensives. The EMBF’s 36th front launched attacks against the Gulf Clan in Briceño, while the 4th front struck in the Nordeste region, targeting areas like El Bagre, Segovia, and Remedios. The 18th front’s defection to Iván Mordisco’s General Central Staff (EMC) in 2025 further destabilised the area, prompting the formation of the Guerrillas Campesinas Los Cabuyos—a new group of deserters from both fronts.

As a result, one in three clashes in northern Antioquia this year has occurred in Briceño, according to ACLED.

Illegal gold mining now covers over 35,000 hectares in Antioquia, with more than 90% concentrated in the Bajo Cauca and Nordeste regions. The ELN and dissident factions have increasingly targeted miners, including artisanal operators known as barequeros, through extortion, threats, and direct attacks.

In May, the ELN warned miners in Bajo Cauca against refusing extortion payments, while ACLED recorded a gold merchant’s killing in Remedios, the abduction of a mining businessman in Caucasia, and a drone strike on a legal mining site in Segovia—Colombia’s second-largest gold-producing municipality.

The violence is expected to intensify over the next three months, with Briceño, Ituango, and Tarazá remaining key flashpoints. Multiple armed groups may simultaneously extort the same mining operators, compounding costs and operational risks. The government’s offensive against armed factions could temporarily divert violence toward state forces, but fiscal constraints and limited aircraft maintenance will hinder sustained military pressure, according to ACLED.

While President Abelardo de la Espriella’s crackdown may weaken some groups, rivals will likely exploit the power vacuum. The use of weaponised drones to target both rivals and mining infrastructure adds another layer of risk, complicating operations in the region. For now, the conflict remains entrenched, with no single faction gaining a decisive advantage.