Asia is rearming fast – but counting the wrong kind of military power

SINGAPORE, 18 AUGUST 2026 —

Asia’s Military Buildup Focuses on Hardware, Not the Capacity to Sustain War

Military expenditure in Asia and Oceania reached US$681 billion in 2025, the fastest annual increase since 2009, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Japan’s defence budget grew 9.7%, while India’s rose 8.9%. Yet these investments often focus on high-profile platforms—ships, aircraft, and missiles—rather than the industrial and logistical capacity needed to sustain warfare.

The debate over regenerative capacity—how quickly militaries can replace lost equipment, repair damaged assets, and restore communications—has gained urgency after Ukraine’s experience, where stockpiles determined the start of the war but manufacturing and repair networks decided its duration.

Japan’s Dilemma: Converting Civilian Factories for Military Use

Japan’s Nissan Motor Co. Oppama Plant in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, is set to close in 2028 after producing 18 million vehicles, including the world’s first mass-market electric car, the Leaf. Now, US defence firm Anduril Industries is in talks to repurpose the facility for military drone production, leveraging its precision manufacturing and skilled workforce.

However, the deal hinges on Japan’s ability to provide steady orders to justify the investment. Japan’s defence industry remains constrained by high costs and limited margins, with 95% of its arms imports in 2021–2025 coming from the US. While the Oppama plant could theoretically pivot to drone manufacturing, the bigger challenge is ensuring long-term funding for idle production lines, spare parts, and repair networks in peacetime.

China’s Advantage: Speed Over Combat-Tested Reliability

China, by contrast, has built a manufacturing ecosystem capable of rapidly churning out drones and components, with civilian drone output growing 37.3% last year. Its arms imports fell 72% in the same period, dropping out of the top 10 global importers for the first time since the early 1990s.

Yet quantity does not equal military effectiveness. While China’s industrial base can produce replacements quickly, questions remain over whether its forces can maintain communications under electronic warfare, coordinate across services, and integrate hardware with training—capabilities that have never been tested in combat.

India’s Integration Challenge: Diverse Suppliers, Complex Logistics

India, the world’s second-largest arms importer, has diversified its suppliers, reducing Russia’s share of purchases from 70% a decade ago to 40%. While this increases strategic autonomy, it also complicates logistics, as French Rafale jets, Russian missiles, and Israeli sensors must work together seamlessly.

During last year’s air battle with Pakistan, at least one Indian Rafale was lost, with French commanders acknowledging the loss while crediting Pakistan’s battlefield management. Subsequent reports indicated Pakistani fighters used data-linked targeting from surveillance aircraft, exploiting a range Indian pilots did not expect. The incident highlighted how advanced platforms can become ineffective without integration and real-time data sharing.

The Missing Metric: Regenerative Capacity

No published data compares how quickly China, Japan, and India could replace losses, repair damage, or restore networks. What is clear, however, is that each faces a distinct bottleneck:

- China lacks combat-tested conversion mechanisms. - Japan struggles with commercially sustainable industrial scale. - India grapples with affordable integration across diverse systems.

The shift in defence spending—from large platforms to replenishment, upgrades, and repairs—favours electronics, communications, automation, and maintenance firms over traditional weapons manufacturers.

Malaysia and Southeast Asia: Caught Between Trends

Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia, are increasing defence budgets but face similar challenges. While regional militaries invest in modern platforms, few have addressed the industrial and logistical foundations needed for prolonged conflict.

Malaysia’s defence expenditure has risen steadily, but its defence industry remains underdeveloped compared to neighbours like Singapore and Indonesia. The focus on hardware acquisition risks leaving gaps in repair networks, spare parts, and rapid-replacement capabilities.

Stakeholder Perspectives: Industry and Military Views

Defence analysts argue that governments must rethink budget allocations to include not just weapons but also the infrastructure to sustain them.

"Defence ministries are set up to sign multiyear contracts for expensive platforms, not to pay for factory lines that sit idle in peacetime," said David Tingxuan Zhang, an analyst at Trivium China, a policy research consultancy.

Industry players, meanwhile, highlight the need for long-term commitments to justify investments in dual-use facilities like Oppama.

The Road Ahead: Will Asia Pay for What Matters?

The Oppama plant may never produce a drone, but the question it raises will persist: Will Asia’s governments fund the invisible but critical elements of wartime resilience?

The next regional crisis may still be decided by the sheer quantity of drones, munitions, and ships. Yet the real measure of military power will be how quickly those assets can be regenerated—on factory floors, in repair depots, and across integrated networks.

For now, Asia is arming itself—but the battle for sustainability has only just begun.

Related: Singapore