U.S.-China nuclear divide deepens as perception gaps risk unintended arms race

BEIJING, 26 SEPTEMBER 2026 —

China and the United States are locked in a widening nuclear standoff where each side interprets the other’s military moves as aggressive while framing its own as defensive, according to a new analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The report traces the divide to fundamentally different strategic assumptions. China rejects any notion of nuclear warfighting, viewing its arsenal solely as a deterrent against nuclear threats, while the U.S. retains a de facto first-use option—limited to "extreme circumstances"—and interprets China’s rapid arsenal expansion as evidence of potential warfighting ambitions. Beijing, in turn, sees U.S. damage-limitation doctrines and missile defense deployments as provocative, reinforcing its belief that Washington seeks nuclear superiority.

Both sides operate under worst-case assumptions, with neither fully aware of how its policies appear to the other.

The perception gap has deepened despite shared recognition of the limited utility of nuclear first use. Most U.S. experts dismiss preemptive strikes against China as unnecessary, while Chinese strategists see little military need for nuclear escalation given their growing conventional capabilities. However, ambiguities in both doctrines—some deliberate, others reflecting unresolved internal debates—fuel mutual distrust. China has not publicly explained the purpose or endpoint of its nuclear buildup, leaving U.S. policymakers to speculate.

Meanwhile, American nuclear posture reviews, such as those emphasizing damage limitation, have deepened Chinese concerns about U.S. nuclear ambitions.

For Malaysia, the risks are primarily indirect but significant. As a key ASEAN member and participant in the Five Power Defence Arrangements, Malaysia could face pressure to align with either bloc in a regional security crisis. Prolonged nuclear uncertainty could disrupt global supply chains, particularly in defence, energy, and technology sectors where U.S.-China competition is already reshaping trade flows. Malaysian defence contractors supplying components to U.S.

or Chinese programmes may encounter shifting procurement priorities or supply chain disruptions. Energy and commodity exports—including oil, gas, and rare earth minerals—could also face volatility if sanctions or trade restrictions escalate. Technology firms, especially those involved in dual-use semiconductors, may encounter restrictions on exports to either market.

The report concludes that traditional arms control agreements are unlikely to bridge the perception gap. Instead, it recommends targeted measures to reduce miscalculation: transparency in nuclear modernisation programmes, restraint on provocative missile defense and space-based weapons, direct dialogue on escalation thresholds, and confidence-building steps in regional proliferation controls. Without such measures, the nuclear dynamic could spiral into an uncontrollable arms race, with Malaysia and other regional actors caught in the crossfire.

The Carnegie Endowment’s analysis underscores that the challenge is not just managing weapons but managing the mutual mistrust that fuels them. For Malaysian policymakers, the priority is monitoring how these tensions reshape global trade and defence partnerships—without being drawn into direct alignment with either side. The report warns that prolonged ambiguity risks escalating action-reaction cycles, even if neither Beijing nor Washington intends conflict.