China’s Commodity Futures Market Expands Scope with New Sand, Diamond Contracts

BEIJING, 30 SEPTEMBER 2026 —

The United States and China have unveiled the initial product lists for their new Board of Trade, a mechanism designed to facilitate reciprocal tariff reductions on specific imports.

The announcement, detailed in a recent assessment by Global Trade Alert, reveals a stark asymmetry in the scope of the two nations’ offers.

China’s published list encompasses 1,619 eight-digit tariff lines drawn from its 2026 tariff schedule, while the United States has identified only 77 eight-digit Harmonized System codes. Despite the significant difference in the number of line items, the total value of imports covered by each side is roughly equivalent, with both lists targeting goods worth approximately $30 billion.

This disparity in line count versus value highlights a strategic divergence in how each nation is approaching the liberalization of trade, with China opting for a broad, granular approach and the United States focusing on a narrower, high-value selection.

The core of the Board of Trade’s working procedures envisages mutually agreed lists of imported goods, with reduced tariff treatment contemplated for the selected products. For Malaysian and regional readers, the significance of this development lies not just in the bilateral relationship between the world’s two largest economies, but in the potential ripple effects on global supply chains. As the U.S.

and China adjust their trade barriers, third-party exporters who have stepped in to fill the void left by reduced U.S. sales to China may face renewed competition. The assessment notes that in 29 of the key products identified, suppliers from other countries have already increased their market share as U.S. imports fell.

If the Board of Trade becomes a standing vehicle for reciprocal tariff cuts, Washington and Beijing would be lowering barriers for each other but not necessarily for everyone else, potentially altering the competitive landscape for regional manufacturers.

A detailed analysis of China’s 1,619 tariff lines reveals that the distribution of trade value is highly uneven. Chinese import statistics indicate that these listed products involved $29.70 billion of imports from the United States in 2024, a figure that sits close to the roughly $30 billion limit established for the agreement. However, the sheer number of lines is misleading regarding their commercial importance.

Remarkably, 903 of the 1,619 tariff lines had no reported imports from the United States at all in 2024. Only 178 lines were associated with imports of $10 million or more from the United States. These 178 lines accounted for 98.2 per cent of China’s 2024 imports from the U.S. within this specific basket, underscoring that the vast majority of the list consists of negligible or non-existent trade flows.

Within the group of 178 commercially important lines, a smaller subset of 70 products stands out as particularly noteworthy. For these 70 products, China imported at least $10 million from the United States in 2024, and U.S. suppliers accounted for at least 25 per cent of China’s total imports of the product that year. These 70 lines were associated with $14.43 billion, representing 48.6 per cent of the entire $29.70 billion import basket.

Another 108 high-value products generated $14.73 billion, or 49.6 per cent of the total, while the remaining 1,441 tariff lines generated only $0.55 billion, or 1.85 per cent. This concentration of value in a small number of lines is what the assessment describes as "diamonds in the sand," suggesting that the true weight of China’s offer rests on a limited number of high-impact items rather than the breadth of the list.

The 70 products identified as "diamonds" include agricultural and food products, medical equipment, North American hardwoods, and specialised chemicals and materials. The assessment highlights specific items such as uncarded cotton, non-seed sorghum, frozen pig offal, in-shell pistachios, raw bovine hides, and fresh or chilled boneless beef. Other notable inclusions are prepared nuts and kernels, whey, frozen salmon, high-purity lactose, in-shell almonds, and edible fat and oil preparations.

The presence of these goods indicates a focus on sectors where U.S. suppliers previously held a substantial share of the Chinese market. The selection appears to target products where China may have found it difficult to replace U.S. supply, potentially aiming to restore trade flows in areas where alternative suppliers have not fully compensated for the loss of American goods.

The trajectory of imports for these 70 products since 2024 provides further insight into the rationale behind their selection. Between January and August 2024 and the same period in 2026, China’s imports from the United States of these 70 products fell from $10.26 billion to $6.00 billion, a decline of 41.5 per cent. In contrast, China’s worldwide imports of the same products fell much less, by only 14.5 per cent. As a result, the U.S.

share of Chinese imports for these items dropped from 44.6 per cent to 30.5 per cent. The decline was broad-based, with the U.S. sourcing share falling in 60 of the 70 products, with a median decline of 9.7 percentage points. This data suggests that the shift away from U.S. suppliers was not solely due to declining Chinese demand, but rather a strategic reallocation of sourcing.

A closer examination of the 70 products reveals three distinct patterns in how China has adjusted its imports. In 11 of the products, China’s worldwide imports were stable or rising even as imports from the United States fell. Across these products, imports from the United States declined 31.9 per cent, while imports from other countries increased 46.9 per cent, and total Chinese imports rose 19.3 per cent.

These are the clearest cases in which China shifted purchases towards alternative suppliers while the Chinese market continued to expand. In another 18 products, China’s imports from the United States fell 46.2 per cent, while imports from other countries rose 32.0 per cent. In these cases, the increase from alternative suppliers was insufficient to offset the lost U.S. supply, leaving total Chinese imports 15.0 per cent lower.

This pattern is consistent with imperfect substitutability across suppliers, where quality differences, technical specifications, certification requirements, or established commercial relationships may have made U.S. imports hard to replace.

In the remaining 26 of the 70 products, imports fell both from the United States and from the rest of the world. Total Chinese imports of these products dropped 39.0 per cent. However, U.S. imports fell more sharply, by 56.9 per cent, compared with a 26.5 per cent decline in imports from other foreign suppliers.

The assessment notes that whether this reflects weaker demand or a lack of suitable alternative suppliers cannot be established without further information. If the latter is the case, it would provide a strong reason for China to list these products, as it would indicate a genuine need to restore supply chains that have been disrupted.

The data collectively show that the value of China’s offer rests on a small number of products, just 4.3 per cent of the list, spanning farm goods, North American hardwoods, medical devices, and specialised chemicals.

For American negotiators and exporters, the depth and durability of tariff cuts on these few dozen lines matter far more than the length of the list. The assessment argues that the evidence is consistent with an effort to restore the supply China may have found hardest to replace.

The $30 billion figure measures the trade covered, not the losses to third parties, which will depend on how far tariffs are cut and whether trade shifts back to U.S. suppliers. The systemic question raised by the Board of Trade is whether it will become a standing vehicle for reciprocal tariff cuts. If so, Washington and Beijing would be lowering barriers for each other but not for everyone else.

Exporters elsewhere that stepped in as U.S. sales to China fell could lose ground if the U.S. share of the Chinese market is restored.

The potential for the $30 billion limit to be ratcheted up over time adds another layer of complexity. This would require longer lists of products for tariff liberalisation, and the question of what drives product selection will recur. The assessment poses the question of how many more "diamonds" lie in the sand, implying that future negotiations will likely focus on identifying additional high-value products where U.S. suppliers have lost ground.

The analysis is based on data from the Trade Data Monitor, which receives data directly from Chinese Customs. The high-value products are defined as those eight-digit HS codes where China imported more than $10 million in 2024. The source of the analysis is Simon J. Evenett, Professor of Geopolitics & Strategy at IMD Business School, Lausanne, Switzerland, and Co-Chair of the Trade & Investment Council at the World Economic Forum.

The implications for the region are significant, particularly for countries that have benefited from the shift in supply chains away from the United States. If the Board of Trade successfully restores U.S. market share in these 70 products, regional exporters may face increased competition. The assessment highlights that in 29 of the 70 products, suppliers from other countries have already increased their market share.

The potential for trade diversion back to the United States could impact the competitiveness of regional manufacturers in sectors such as agriculture, medical equipment, and specialized chemicals. The forward-looking close of the assessment suggests that the focus will remain on the specific products where U.S. suppliers have lost ground, rather than the broader list of tariff lines.

The durability of the tariff cuts on these key products will be the determining factor in the success of the Board of Trade.