A Resurgent UMNO: Daring Anwar, But Not Walking Out Just Yet
UMNO is daring Pakatan Harapan to expel it from the Unity Government and call for an early election. The party’s history suggests it would rather not be the one to quit the coalition.
Source: Fulcrum · October 12, 2026 at 3:02 AM · AI-assisted report
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KOTA KINABALU, 12 OCTOBER 2026 —
UMNO President and Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi has formally dared Pakatan Harapan (PH) to expel the United Malays National Organisation from the Unity Government, a move that would force Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to either call for an early general election or test his parliamentary majority through a vote of no confidence.
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This public challenge, issued during the UMNO General Assembly in mid-September, marks the most visible deterioration in ties between Zahid and Anwar, yet the party’s strategic calculus suggests it is unlikely to voluntarily leave the coalition. Instead, UMNO is leveraging its recent electoral successes and the conditional pardon of former Prime Minister Najib Razak to assert leverage, betting that PH will not take the risk of destabilizing the government before the next general election.
The resurgence of UMNO, which ruled Malaysia for six decades prior to its historic defeat in 2018, is underpinned by a series of political victories that have shifted momentum back to the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. In July, BN secured a decisive win in the Johor state elections, capturing 48 of 56 seats, followed by a victory in Negeri Sembilan in August where it won 25 of 36 seats.
These results were achieved through an electoral pact with the opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN), effectively ending PH’s eight-year rule in those states. The Negeri Sembilan polls were particularly significant for PH, as they resulted in the defeat of two prominent politicians: Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) Vice President Aminuddin Harun and Democratic Action Party (DAP) Secretary General Anthony Loke.
BN is also positioned to retain power in Malacca, which dissolved its state assembly on 23 September and must hold a state election within 60 days.
Adding to UMNO’s confidence is the royal decision to grant former UMNO President and Prime Minister Najib Razak a conditional pardon, commuting his 1MDB-related prison sentence to house arrest. This development has energized the party’s grassroots base, providing a symbolic boost to a leadership that has faced internal scrutiny. Zahid capitalized on this momentum at the mid-September General Assembly, where he threw down the gauntlet to critics within PH.
He explicitly dared PH to formally expel UMNO from the Unity Government or call for an early election, a challenge that would force Anwar to test his majority in the Dewan Rakyat. Although Zahid appeared to backtrack at a subsequent press conference, maintaining that UMNO would remain in the Unity Government until the end of the term, the underlying tension between the two leaders remains evident.
The friction between UMNO and the Unity Government is not solely political but also stems from legal and institutional pressures. Several party stalwarts have been arrested and charged with graft allegations, including Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim, former Tabung Haji chairman and close ally of Najib, and former Religious Affairs Minister Jamil Khir Baharom, who served as UMNO Kedah liaison chief.
Additionally, former UMNO Vice President Ismail Sabri Yaakob and current Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) Deputy President Saravanan Murugan were charged following investigations by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. These legal challenges have fueled a longer-standing anxiety among UMNO supporters that the party’s continued association with Anwar and DAP, derisively labeled by critics as “UMDAP,” is damaging UMNO’s prospects for recovering Malay support.
Despite the public posturing, Zahid has notably avoided mentioning a third option that lies entirely within UMNO’s control: leaving the government to force Anwar’s hand for an early dissolution. The political calculus is straightforward. Parliament’s term expires in December 2027, and the general election must be held by February 2028. However, UMNO prefers an early election given that current momentum favors the BN coalition.
By staying in government, UMNO retains access to state resources and the machinery of power, a position it has historically prioritized. The party’s reluctance to quit is rooted in its historical trajectory; UMNO has never contested a general election as an opposition party.
It governed continuously from independence in 1957 until 2018 and returned to power less than two years later through the 2020 Sheraton Move, a political maneuver that led to the fall of the PH coalition government.
If UMNO were to leave the government and fail to trigger a snap election immediately, it would face up to 15 months without access to government machinery and state resources. This period of opposition would be unprecedented in the party’s modern history and carries significant risks. Furthermore, UMNO is uncertain about the level of support it can secure from Borneo if it exits the coalition. Anwar’s Unity Government currently commands approximately 150 MPs.
If BN quits, Anwar’s support would drop to 120 seats, which is a simple majority above the 112-seat threshold required to sustain a government, provided that Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) remain aligned with the federal government.
The Borneo parties have little incentive to leave the current configuration. On 11 September, Anwar chaired the MA63 Implementation Action Council in Kota Kinabalu with Sabah Chief Minister Hajiji Noor and Sarawak Premier Abang Johari Openg. During this meeting, the federal government agreed to raise Sabah and Sarawak’s share of parliamentary seats, a change that requires a constitutional amendment.
Additionally, Sabah and Sarawak will each receive a MYR1.5 billion (USD367 million) interim special grant this year as negotiations continue over the states’ push for 40 per cent revenue entitlement. These concessions, along with other initiatives announced on Malaysia Day, demonstrate that the Borneo partners are receiving tangible benefits from a prime minister who needs their support.
GPS and GRS have no guarantee that a successor government would be as accommodating, particularly if a coalition wins an outright majority in Peninsular Malaysia without requiring Borneo’s support to form the federal government.
The dynamics of coalition politics in Malaysia are further complicated by the current membership structures of the major coalitions. As of 25 September 2026, Barisan Nasional consists of UMNO, MCA, MIC, PBRS, and PPP. Pakatan Harapan includes PKR, DAP, and Amanah, with UPKO having left in November 2025. Perikatan Nasional comprises PAS, Wawasan, Gerakan, MIPP, and Pejuang, though Bersatu’s membership is disputed.
The Registrar of Societies suspended all PN activities on 23 September 2026, giving the coalition 30 days to defend itself against Bersatu’s complaint to avoid deregistration. In Borneo, Gabungan Parti Sarawak includes PBB, SUPP, PRS, and PDP, while Gabungan Rakyat Sabah consists of Gagasan Rakyat, PBS, LDP, PHRS, PCS, and UPKO.
If PH calls UMNO’s bluff and expels it from the ruling coalition, UMNO would be free to play the role of the aggrieved party. This strategy would allow UMNO to persuade Borneo partners that PH “destabilized” the Unity Government rather than UMNO. The optics of being the first-mover to trigger government collapse are not appealing to the public, particularly at a time of economic uncertainty and potential energy crisis, a lesson Perikatan Nasional has learned.
By remaining in the government, UMNO avoids the negative perception of causing instability while retaining the ability to influence policy and maintain its proximity to power.
UMNO’s proximity to power is not incidental but existential, a near-necessity for a party that has spent only 22 months outside federal power in Zahid’s eight years as president. Abandoning the reins of power voluntarily is a gamble that UMNO has never taken. The party is likely to enter the next general election still in government, whether as part of Anwar’s Unity Government or under some other configuration.
The current standoff is less about an immediate break and more about positioning for the next electoral cycle, where UMNO aims to leverage its recent successes and the political landscape to secure a favorable outcome.
The situation highlights the complex interplay between historical legacy, current political leverage, and future electoral strategy in Malaysia. UMNO’s daring of PH to expel it is a calculated move to test the limits of the Unity Government’s cohesion while safeguarding its own interests.
As the political landscape evolves, with state elections in Malacca approaching and the Borneo partnerships under negotiation, UMNO’s decision to stay in the government for the foreseeable future underscores its commitment to maintaining its dominant position in Malaysian politics.
The next general election will ultimately determine whether UMNO can translate its current momentum into a lasting return to power, but for now, the party remains firmly entrenched in the Unity Government, daring its partners to make the first move.