China's Middle East policy at crossroads six months into US‑Israeli war over Iran

KUALA LUMPUR/SINGAPORE, 29 AUGUST 2026 —

China’s Middle East Policy Tested as Gulf States Rethink Security Alliances Amid Iran War

The war has forced Gulf leaders to confront a stark reality: neither the United States nor China can guarantee their protection against Iranian attacks. On Wednesday, Iran’s military reiterated warnings that any future conflict with the US could escalate into a regional conflagration, targeting critical energy and communications infrastructure. In response, Gulf states have accelerated efforts to diversify their defence partnerships.

On Thursday, Kuwait signed a military cooperation agreement with Pakistan, which pledged to enhance training and bolster the emirate’s defensive capabilities. This followed Saudi Arabia’s three-way pact with Turkey and Pakistan, which included a NATO-style mutual defence clause—an arrangement analysts suggest may set a precedent for other US-aligned nations seeking greater strategic autonomy.

Zhu Zhaoyi, executive director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at Beijing’s Pangoal Institution, described the Iran war as an “imperative accelerator” compelling neighbouring countries to reassess their positions. “Over the past decade, US dominance in the Middle East has steadily unravelled, yet considerable uncertainty remains regarding what a post-American regional order will look like,” he said.

“Middle powers such as Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are all exercising greater autonomy and engaging in higher-intensity strategic manoeuvres.”

When the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran in late February, Gulf states initially hoped China—Tehran’s key diplomatic and economic partner—would leverage its influence to broker a negotiated settlement. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducted extensive shuttle diplomacy, engaging counterparts in all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, as well as Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Turkey.

In April, President Xi Jinping unveiled a four-point peace plan during a meeting with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Beijing. Despite these efforts, Iran continued its attacks on Gulf targets, underscoring the gap between China’s diplomatic clout and its limited ability to shape outcomes.

“The war exposed the gap between China’s influence and its power,” said Naser al-Tamimi, a British-based political analyst and founder of MidEast Strategia, a consultancy specialising in geostrategy and China-Gulf relations. “Beijing has significant economic leverage over Iran and privileged political access in Tehran, but it does not control Iranian decision-making.

Nor is China prepared to expend substantial political, economic, or military capital to restrain Iran for the Gulf’s benefit—especially when Tehran believes its regime’s survival is at stake.” He noted that while China views Gulf states as partners for energy, trade, and investment, its core interests lie elsewhere, and its policy remains guided by non-interventionism.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow at Chatham House and head of the China Studies Unit at the Emirates Policy Centre, characterised China’s approach as “involvement without commitment.” “This position was designed as a risk-mitigation insurance policy, not as a diplomatic offensive aimed at gaining more influence,” he said. Tamimi added that Gulf states are now shifting from “hedging between great powers to hedging against dependence itself,” seeking to reduce reliance on both Washington and Beijing.

This evolving dynamic has left China’s Middle East policy—and its ambitions to act as a neutral mediator—at a crossroads. In 2023, Beijing brokered the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, followed in 2024 by facilitating a unity declaration among 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah. However, Aboudouh cautioned that Iran’s continued aggression against Gulf states risks undermining China’s reconciliation model.

“By targeting Gulf states, Iran is effectively undermining Beijing’s model of reconciliation established by the Iran-Saudi rapprochement,” he said. “If this model collapses, China’s diplomatic posture may be forced back to square one.”

Zhu argued that China must avoid entanglement in regional alliances, warning that siding with any bloc would undermine its narrative as a leader of the Global South. “Maintaining strategic composure between multipolarisation and bloc politics is the central issue Beijing faces in this conflict,” he said. “It is also a litmus test for the maturity of China’s Middle East policy.”

The shifting security landscape presents both challenges and opportunities for Malaysia and Southeast Asia. As Gulf states diversify their defence ties, regional players like Malaysia—with its longstanding ties to both China and the Middle East—may find new avenues for engagement. However, the lack of clarity on China’s long-term strategy in the region leaves stakeholders navigating uncharted waters.

For now, the war’s trajectory remains uncertain, with Iran’s threats of regional escalation looming large. As Gulf states accelerate their self-reliance efforts, the question persists: Can China maintain its delicate balancing act, or will it be compelled to take a more assertive role in shaping the Middle East’s future? The answers may well define the next phase of global geopolitics.

Related: Wang Yi · Kuala Lumpur/Singapore