Iran’s elite forces shape young cadets’ minds

BERLIN, 12 OCTOBER 2026 —

Iran’s Elite Forces: How the Regime ‘Molds Minds’ of Cadets in a Shadow Network of Assassinations and Surveillance

Their accounts, corroborated by documents, photos, and interviews with experts, paint a picture of a regime that maintains absolute control over its most dangerous operatives, even as it faces mounting international pressure, economic collapse, and relentless attacks from Israel and the United States.

The defectors—one a former commander in Iran’s special forces, the other a veteran of the Intelligence Ministry—describe a system where recruits are subjected to round-the-clock ideological conditioning, where officers live in segregated compounds under constant surveillance, and where a clandestine network of high-ranking officials plots extrajudicial killings both inside and outside Iran.

Their testimonies, shared over months of correspondence with DW’s investigative unit, expose how the regime sustains its security apparatus amid widespread protests, crippling sanctions, and the decimation of its political and military leadership.

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The first defector, identified only as Omid, joined Iran’s security forces at 18, driven by what he described as a “deep commitment to my country.” His experience at the academy, he told DW, was one of total subjugation. “They mold the minds of the young cadets,” he said.

“Day and night, from military training to daily prayers and speeches, they ensure absolute loyalty.” Over decades of service, Omid rose through the ranks to command Iran’s elite special forces, granting him access to resources, personnel, and a network of officers who operate beyond the reach of government oversight.

Omid’s revelations include details of Dakhme, an unassuming prayer hall in Shahr-e Rey, just outside Tehran, where high-ranking officials secretly convene to plan operations that bypass official channels. “It’s a killing machine,” he said of the meetings held under its corrugated iron roof. He claimed to have attended sessions where decisions about murders—both domestically and abroad—were made, though he insisted he had never personally participated in such operations.

Among the alleged targets were dissidents, opposition figures, and even foreign nationals, though DW could not independently verify specific cases.

The second defector, referred to as Reza, worked for Iran’s Intelligence Ministry and came from a family deeply embedded in the regime. Like many recruits, he initially viewed his role as serving Islam and the Islamic Republic, even crying during prayers as a young officer. His perspective shifted dramatically after witnessing the regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters, particularly during the January 2026 crackdown—when security forces opened fire on demonstrators amid a near-total internet shutdown.

Thousands were killed, including unarmed protesters in hospital beds, according to human rights organizations. Reza described the psychological toll of serving such a system: “The truth is: When your opponent is a regime that doesn’t adhere to any moral values, you need to be prepared for anything.”

Both defectors detailed the regime’s surveillance infrastructure, which includes real-time monitoring of protests via CCTV, drones, and social media interception. Elite units, often clad in black balaclavas, are deployed to suppress dissent, armed with military-grade firearms. Amnesty International’s Iran researcher, Raha Bahreini, noted that the use of such weapons—designed for combat—against civilians indicates the regime’s intent to eliminate protesters systematically.

The defectors also revealed the privileges and controls imposed on officers. While they enjoy financial incentives, lucrative business contracts, and segregated compounds with their own mosques and schools, their freedoms are severely restricted. Passports are confiscated, travel is approved by superiors, and even the education of their children is dictated by the regime. Prospective spouses are vetted, and officers are forbidden from discussing their true work with family.

Omid described the psychological strain: “They confiscate your passport; they even decide which schools your children are allowed to attend. That really eats away at you.”

Saeid Golkar, a political scientist at the University of Tennessee and expert on Iran’s security apparatus, analyzed the defectors’ accounts. He told DW that the regime’s ability to isolate its officers from regular Iranians allows for more effective indoctrination and peer pressure. “They can create a closed loop where dissent is unthinkable,” Golkar said.

“And when these forces are cut off from civilian society, they’re less likely to hesitate in using lethal force against their own people.”

The defectors’ testimonies also highlight the financial and logistical advantages enjoyed by the security elite. Officers are granted access to state-contracted businesses, allowing them to amass wealth while maintaining their loyalty. Reza, for instance, described how his unit operated with near-total autonomy, using intercepted communications and social media to track and suppress dissent before it escalated.

When DW approached Iran’s Supreme Leader’s Office and the Embassy of Iran in Berlin for comment, the Supreme Leader’s Office did not respond. The Berlin embassy dismissed the allegations as baseless, stating: “The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly rejects these allegations and the conclusions drawn from them.”

The defectors’ accounts come amid a broader context of regime instability. Iran has lost much of its top military and political leadership to Israeli and U.S. strikes, while domestic protests—fueled by inflation, shortages, and repression—continue unabated. The regime’s ability to maintain control hinges on its ability to keep its security apparatus loyal, isolated, and ruthless. For Omid and Reza, that loyalty came at a cost: years of complicity in atrocities that now haunt them.

Their decision to speak out reflects a growing disillusionment among some of Iran’s most dangerous operatives, though the risks remain severe.

As DW’s investigation continues, the full extent of the regime’s shadow network—its operations, its targets, and its methods—remains partially obscured. But the defectors’ testimonies offer a rare glimpse into how Iran’s security apparatus functions in practice, and why it remains so effective despite decades of international isolation and internal strife.